I must say I’m rather confused about this.
Our biggest issue with cryptography isn’t that packages don’t keep up with GHC releases. It’s that they have had no external audit and that there’s very little confidence about whether Haskell is even the right language for low-level crypto and what we’d need to do in order to make it feasible.
Here are some threads I’ve raised over the years:
- [Haskell-cafe] cryptography in haskell
- security considerations · Issue #23 · GaloisInc/haskell-tor · GitHub
Cryptography isn’t like other ecosystem parts where you should just “get your hands dirty”. It’s so critical and easy to mess up that it’s better only people with very extensive knowledge work on it. That includes seemingly trivial patches as the infamous Debian OpenSSL debacle illustrates, where an incompetent maintainer tried to fix a valgrind warning.
So I’m not sure what the HF is trying to do here. To me, it seems the only reasonable way forward is to temporarily mark all crypto implementations that are implemented in Haskell as NOT AUDITED and fund research about crypto security in Haskell similar to the everest project.